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Speeches
Destined for Servitude
By JUAN F. PEREA*
Introduction
I AM HONORED TO PRESENT this lecture in honor of Jack
Pemberton, a tireless warrior for civil rights and justice.1 My lecture is
titled “Destined for Servitude.” I will explore some of the present ves-
tiges of constitutional evil in the pro-slavery provisions contained in
the U.S. Constitution.2 As I will demonstrate, the desire to protect slav-
ery casts a long shadow into the present.
The original Constitution of 1787 contains several provisions that
protect slavery. These include: Article I, section 2, clause 3—the infa-
mous “three-fifths” provision—which increased the representation of
* Professor Perea is the Cone, Wagner, Nugent, Johnson, Hazouri & Roth Professor
of Law at the University of Florida, Levin College of Law, where he teaches and writes in
the areas of race and race relations, constitutional law, employment law, and professional
responsibility.  Professor Perea has been a visiting professor at Harvard Law School, Boston
College Law School, and University of Colorado School of Law.  He received his J.D.,
magna cum laude, from Boston College in 1986, where he served on the Law Review.  From
1986–1987, he clerked for the Honorable Bruce M. Selya of the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit.  He is the author of LATINOS AND THE LAW (West 2008) (with
Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic), and RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A
DIVERSE AMERICA (2d. ed. West 2007) (with Richard Delgado, Angela Harris, Jean Stefancic
and Stephanie Wildman).  He is editor of and contributor to IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW
NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES (NYU Press 1997).  He is
the author of many articles and book chapters on racial inequality, immigration history,
and on the civil rights of Latinos in the United States.  His articles have appeared in
Harvard Law Review, California Law Review, NYU Law Review, UCLA Law Review, and
Minnesota Law Review, among others. He is a member of the American Law Institute.
1. I’d like to give special thanks to Professor Maria Ontiveros, who invited me to
deliver this lecture, and to Bettyann Hinchman, for her help in making all the necessary
arrangements. I’d also like to thank the members of the University of San Francisco Law
Review for their assistance in publishing this lecture.
2. I’d like to acknowledge Professor Mark A. Graber for his insightful book, DRED
SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006), to whom I owe the phrase “con-
stitutional evil” and some of my understanding of its ramifications.
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southern states in Congress by adding three-fifths the number of
slaves held as property to the number of free persons residing in each
state; Article I, section 9, which uniquely limited Congress’ commerce
power, forbidding its exercise to limit the slave trade until 1808; Arti-
cle IV, section 2, clause 3—the Fugitive Slave Clause—which guaran-
teed to slave owners the right to reclaim escaped slaves; and finally,
Article V, which prohibited amending Article I, section 9 for a period
of twenty years. Paul Finkelman has identified several other provisions
of the Constitution that either directly or indirectly protected slavery
and slave ownership.3
A series of antebellum enactments and cases further supported
these constitutional provisions and the institution of slavery. A federal
fugitive slave law was enacted in 1793, and later modified in 1853,
despite its dubious constitutionality.4 Despite antebellum priority of
state interests over federal, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Prigg v. Penn-
sylvania,5 found that federal fugitive slave legislation was constitu-
tional and that state laws adding more requirements than the federal
law, like Pennsylvania’s, were not. Lastly, the Supreme Court in Dred
Scott v. Sandford,6 relying in part on framers’ intent, held that blacks
were never intended to have federal citizenship, and therefore Scott,
lacking such citizenship, was not entitled to invoke the federal court’s
diversity jurisdiction. While the Dred Scott decision is almost uniformly
condemned in constitutional law textbooks and commentaries, it can
persuasively be argued that it was legally correct given the Court’s rea-
soning and the premises of the time.7 While one might consider Dred
Scott morally wrong today, it was almost certainly correct in its basic
assertions about framers’ intent. In short, the Dred Scott case is con-
demnable only because the framers’ Constitution sanctioned the evil
supported by the case.
Given the text of the Constitution and its legislative and deci-
sional progeny, it is a fairly straightforward conclusion to understand
3. PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF
JEFFERSON 6–10 (2d ed. 2001).
4. See Paul Finkelman, Fugitive Slaves, in OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES 319–20 (Kermit L. Hall et. al eds., 1992). The constitutionality of
the federal legislation was dubious because, despite the existence of the Fugitive Slave
Clause, Congress had been given no explicit enumerated power under Article I, section 8,
to enact legislation to enforce the clause. Justice Harlan makes this point in his dissenting
opinion in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
5. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
6. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
7. See MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL
15–16, 28–30, 46–48 (2006).
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the antebellum Constitution as a pro-slavery document. Indeed, in
1788, just after its drafting, General Charles Pinckney, delegate to the
constitutional convention from South Carolina and primary advocate
for its pro-slavery provisions, commented: “In short considering all cir-
cumstances, we have made the best terms for the security of this spe-
cies of property [slaves] it was in our power to make. We would have
made better if we could; but on the whole, I do not think them bad.”8
While it is certainly true that not every delegate to the convention
approved of slavery or the pro-slavery compromises, the text of the
Constitution speaks for itself.
The Constitution—our organic law—explicitly sanctioned and
supported a system of slave labor9 mostly used for southern agricul-
ture. I will argue that slavery as a labor system, and near-slavery after
Reconstruction, have been deeply entrenched in our social structure
since the founding and still persist today. To a significant degree, our
national union depended on acquiescence in the slave labor system.
But to what extent has the production of a slave labor class, de-
fined by race, persisted beyond the Constitution’s origins? One could
argue that the radical transformation wrought by the Reconstruction
amendments altered the national consensus regarding slavery. Yet
while the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery, and the Four-
teenth Amendment required equal protection, the command of these
amendments was largely ignored at the end of radical Reconstruc-
tion.10 The price of reconciliation between North and South was the
North’s withdrawal of federal troops from the South, which allowed
southerners essentially to re-enslave nominally free blacks through
abusive sharecropping and tenant farmer systems, black codes, and
white mob violence—an intricate system of quasi-slavery.11 Thus, it is
possible to recognize, at the end of radical Reconstruction, the out-
lines of the original Constitutional bargain, a consensus to preserve
racially defined slave labor as an important feature of our national
union.
I. The New Deal Era
It is also possible to recognize the outlines of this Constitutional
bargain in the enactment of New Deal labor and welfare legislation.
8. FINKELMAN, supra note 3, at 10. R
9. When I refer to slavery as a labor system, I mean the promotion and production of
a permanent, exploited class of manual laborers, defined by race, destined for servitude.
10. GEOFFREY R. STONE, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 457–64 (5th ed. 2005).
11. WILLIAM GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION, 1869–1879, at 346–48 (1979).
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Several major federal statutes were proposed and enacted during
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s presidency, including the Social Security Act,
the National Labor Relations Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act.
In order to win the votes of Southern Democrats, which he needed to
pass the legislation, Roosevelt agreed to a series of measures and limi-
tations that would exclude most black employees from most of the
benefits offered by these federal labor and welfare statutes.
The Social Security Act (“SSA”), for example, was first intended
by Roosevelt to cover all employees.12 However, the prospect of cash
benefits paid to black agricultural and domestic workers proved too
inclusive for Southern Democrats:
The Old-Age Insurance provisions of the Social Security Act were
founded on racial exclusion. In order to make a national program
of old-age benefits palatable to powerful southern congressional
barons, the Roosevelt administration acceded to a southern
amendment excluding agricultural and domestic employees from
OAI coverage. This provision alone eliminated more than half the
African Americans in the labor force and over three-fifths of black
southern workers. The systematic exclusion of blacks through oc-
cupational classifications was crucial to the passage of the act.13
By denying old-age insurance benefits and other benefits under the
SSA to most black employees, Southern Democrats guaranteed that
most blacks, and especially southern blacks, would remain an impov-
erished and dependent underclass still subject to the whims of the
white masters of the segregated South.14
Like the original version of the SSA, the original version of the
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) included agricultural work-
ers.15 However, agricultural and domestic workers were later excluded
from the Act in an amendment by the Senate Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor.16 This exclusion remained unchanged in all subse-
quent versions, including the version finally enacted. There was
apparently no debate on the explicitly racial effects of the exclusion of
agricultural and domestic employees, leading some commentators to
12. See, e.g., IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HIS-
TORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 43 (2005).
13. Robert C. Lieberman, Race, Institutions, and the Administration of Social Policy, 19
SOC. SCI. HIST. 511, 514–15 (1995).
14. Some commentators have understood this exclusion as a result of administrative
difficulties in accounting for these types of employees. See, e.g., Gareth Davies & Martha
Derthick, Race and Social Welfare Policy: The Social Security Act of 1935, 112 POL. SCI. Q. 217,
224–26 (1997). For a critique of their argument, see KATZNELSON, supra note 12, at 43–44 R
n.56.
15. KATZNELSON, supra note 12, at 57. R
16. Id. at 57–58.
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understand the exclusion as more racially neutral than other contem-
porary statutes.17 However, some collateral support for the view that
racism was a motivation behind the NLRA can be found in Congress’
failure to enact non-discrimination provisions applicable to unions.
Unions were left free to discriminate against blacks seeking to join.
The benefits of collective bargaining, then, were disproportionately
available only to industrialized and unionized white workers.
It is more persuasive to view the exclusion of agricultural and do-
mestic workers in the NLRA as consistent in intent with contempora-
neously passed statutes rather than being viewed as an isolated
exception. In the preceding SSA, legislators had crafted a formula—
exclusion of agricultural and domestic workers—to satisfy Southern
Democrats by denying federal benefits to most black employees. Hav-
ing found a formula that would secure passage of the legislation, it
seems natural that Congress would adopt the same formula in subse-
quent legislation that would have otherwise conferred substantial fed-
eral rights on black employees. The exclusion of black employees kept
them in a subservient position, dependent on the whims of white
landowners and employers, and preserved the racial caste system of
the segregated South. It strains credulity to think that southern white
landowners and employers would support a federal right to bargain
collectively for agricultural and domestic workers, which would
strengthen their bargaining position and create the possibility of fed-
eral interference in the racial caste system. Why would southerners
support a right so potentially disruptive of the structure of their
society?
Southern Democratic concerns about excluding blacks from fed-
eral benefits and the threat of federal tampering with southern racial
prerogatives were key features of the debate on the subsequent Fair
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). The prospects of a minimum wage,
equalized wages between whites and blacks, and centralized federal
administration of such a program raised strong objections among
southern congressmen. For example, Representative J. Mark Wilcox
of Florida stated:
[T]here is another matter of great importance in the South, and
that is the problem of our Negro labor. There has always been a
difference in the wage scale of white and colored labor. . . . You
cannot put the Negro and the white man on the same basis and get
17. See id. at 57; see also Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act:
Racial Discrimination in the New Deal, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1335, 1336 n.12 (1987) (commenting
that the NLRA was a possible exception to the rule of racism structuring the other New
Deal enactments).
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away with it. Not only would such a situation result in grave social
and racial conflicts but it would also result in throwing the Negro
out of employment and in making him a public charge.18
Once again, the prescribed solution was to exclude agricultural and
domestic workers from the coverage of the Act. It was well understood
that this exclusion would harm black farm and domestic workers.
Three major pieces of New Deal legislation—the Social Security
Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and the Fair Labor Standards
Act—all excluded agricultural and domestic workers from their pro-
tections. The motive, in each case, was to secure necessary southern
support for passage of the legislation by keeping black workers in an
impoverished, dependent state in which neither they nor the federal
government posed any threat to the racist regime of segregation in
the South.
Like the original constitutional bargain to protect slavery, the
New Deal congresses passed legislation that replicated a slavery-style
labor system in which the most vulnerable and exploited participants,
black agricultural and domestic workers, were excluded from labor
protections. In enacting the Constitution, slavery was protected in or-
der to assure southern support for the Constitution and the national
union. One hundred and fifty years later, New Deal era legislators
again protected racist southern prerogatives in exchange for the pass-
ing of novel federal labor legislation.
II. The Present
Most of the exclusionary provisions described before have been
modified, creating greater racial fairness in the Social Security System
and the FLSA.19 One provision in the FLSA continues to exclude agri-
cultural and domestic workers.20 This exclusion means that these
workers, unlike most others, have no protection against being forced
to work unreasonable numbers of hours and entitlement to overtime
pay.21
18. 82 CONG. REC. 1404 (1937).
19. See, e.g., Linder, supra note 17, at 1388–93 (tabular data and descriptions of re- R
pealed exclusions from FLSA coverage).
20. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(b), 213(a)–(b) (2006).
21. According to Marc Linder: “Farm workers employed on large farms remain today,
as they were in 1938, the only numerically significant group of adult minimum-wage work-
ers wholly excluded from the maximum hours provision of the FLSA on the basis of a
criterion unrelated to the size of the employer.” Linder, supra note 17, at 1389. R
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Remarkably, the exclusion for agricultural and domestic workers
still exists, unaltered, in the NLRA.22 Today, agricultural and domestic
workers have absolutely no federally protected right to organize and
bargain collectively. Consider the damage this exclusion does: absent
protective state legislation, farm owners, or labor contractors, can fire
farm workers with impunity for acting collectively or seeking to union-
ize, therefore contributing to their exploitation and vulnerability at
the bottom rungs of the economy.
Though the people affected have changed, the operation of the
agricultural and domestic worker exclusions have not. The huge ma-
jority of agricultural laborers and domestic workers today, approxi-
mately eighty-three percent, are Latino immigrants and citizens.23
Statutorily sanctioned exploitation and oppression intended to keep
Blacks subservient now keep Latino farm workers subservient. This ex-
ploitation of brown Latino employees is no more justifiable than was
the earlier exploitation of Blacks. This exclusion continues to func-
tion as historically intended by guaranteeing the profitability and per-
manence of plantation-style, quasi-slave labor that deprives these
employees of minimum standards of labor protection. One can only
imagine the benefit these workers could reap from competent union
representation.
The preservation and continuing operation of this debilitating
exception in our primary labor law can teach us powerful lessons.
First, laws designed to preserve racial inequality and caste have been
remarkably effective and, in this case, long-lived. Second, racially
targeted inequality has been accomplished through the carefully cal-
culated use of racially neutral language. Third, the failure to examine
closely the origins of oppressive statutory language leads to an easy
acceptance of ostensibly race-neutral language as somehow “natural”
or “necessary,” rather than as a racist structure that should be chal-
lenged as such. This is how structural racism occurs—when we lose
the collective memory of the very precise reasons why oppressive legis-
lation was enacted in the first place.
Lastly, there is a prescription here for advocates of the undocu-
mented and of farm and domestic laborers. Immigration reform pro-
22. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006) (“The term ‘employee’ shall include any employee
. . . but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service
of any family or person at his home . . . .”) (emphasis added).
23. DANIEL CARROLL, RUTH M. SAMARDICK, SCOTT BERNARD, SUSAN GABBARD & TRISH
HERNANDEZ, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, REPORT NO. 9, FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL AGRICUL-
TURAL WORKERS SURVEY 2001–2002: A DEMOGRAPHIC AND EMPLOYMENT PROFILE OF UNITED
STATES FARM WORKERS 4 (2005).
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posals continue to make the news. The principal feature of these
proposals is a path to citizenship and legal status in the country.
Surely that is a necessary and important step.
However, my analysis suggests that citizenship alone is not
enough. Without meaningful reform of the labor laws, citizenship
alone for the undocumented will simply guarantee a more-or-less per-
manent class of exploited citizens still toiling on today’s equivalent of
the plantation. Blacks were, and remain, such a class of exploited citi-
zens, indicating that immigration reform alone is not enough. It must
be coupled with the repeal of labor laws intended to oppress.
It is past time to amend the labor laws and to purge one more
vestige of our antebellum evil from that which we respect as law.
